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annual flow of arpensatiori shifted away fran benefits by at least $9
billion.
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Salariesreceived by academics have attracted much attention from
economists and others.' Yet amid all of that attention no study has
examined the pecuniary nonwage benefits received by university and
college faculties. This is especially surprising given our interest in
studying our economic situation, both as a microcosm of broader labor
markets and as a matter of immediate personal concern to us. Is the
determination of employee benefits different in academe from elsewhere?
If not, can we learn anything from it that is generally applicable?
A substantial literature has arisen studying the role of pecuniary
benefits in compensation. These benefits have increased in importance
in the past forty years. Their growth and, more generally, workers'
interest in them, has been attributed to changing preferences of
employees (Lester, 1967); changing tax laws (Long and Scott, 1982;
woodbury, 1983) ; the role of unions (Freeman, 1981); scale economies in
their provision (Mitchell and Andrews, 1981), and to miscellaneous other
sources. These potential causes have been studied using aggregate time—
series data, and using cross—section data reflecting either aggregates
or, in a few cases (for example, Woodbury, 1983, and Sloan and Adamache,
1986) ,microeconomicunits.
the general approach has been to model pecuniary benefits as being
traded off by workers subject to the employer's budget constraint on
total compensation. The terms of the trade—off depend on the tax price
of benefits, and the demand for benefits is shifted by factors thought
to cause parallel shifts in the constraint and by other effects on
workers' preferences. While the results demonstrate the correlation of
taxes and the share of benefits in total compensation, they have several
problems. one less important issue is the divorce in most studies
1between the level at which choices are made and the aggregate levels at
which most studies examine the results of those choices. Decisions that
result in nonlinear relationships at the micro level are examined using
aggregate data, with little attention to what might be lost by aggregation
A more serious problem is the lack of unanimity in the literature
about the appropriate measure of the price of benefits. The most
important difficulty, though, is the inability of all previous research
to extricate workers' preferences from differences in prices and
incomes. The problem is inherent in any cross—section or time—series
study of demand; but it is especially severe in the consumer—theoretic
approach to choices where relative prices are explicitly a nonlinear
function of income because tax rates are a function of income. The
estimation of price effects on employee benefits is a good example of
this difficulty; estimating demand elasticities for charitable giving
(Clotfelter, 1985) is another.
This study of college and university professors' demand for nonwage
benefits offers solutions to these difficulties. Because the data
describe outcomes at individual campuses, problems of overaggregation
are obviated. We use a variety of measures of the tax price of
benefits. By using a panel of campuses, we can determine whether any
relationship between incomes (and tax prices) and the demand for
benefits is real or instead results from the correlation of worker
preferences for benefits with incomes and prices. Before analyzing
faculties' demand for benefits formally, we first study the growth and
structure of benefits in higher education compared to the broader labor
market. This comparison answers the question whether, at least in terms
of outcomes, the academic labor market is typical of labor markets
2generally, and thus whether analyzing the determination of benefits in
academe can be more than a case study.
The data we use cover cross sections before and after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. The TRA offers a natural experiment that allows us
to infer the impact of taxes on the demand for benefits in academe and
perhaps in labor markets more generally. Also, the 1980s have seen very
rapid growth in the relative price of employer—provided health insurance.
We use our results to infer how that increase has affected the structure
of compensation.
II.FacultyBenefits Developmentsand Comparisons
Differencesinmeasurement practices across sets of data, and
within those sets over time, make it difficult to infer whether the
growth of benefits in academe is similar to that in the rest of the
economy. The data on faculty come from annual surveys conducted by the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The problem with
comparing these surveys over time is that the sample size has grown
greatly. Data on the broader labor market also present problems. A
leading private survey (Chamber of Commerce, 1989) provides excellent
detail on benefits by type; but like the AAUP data, its scope grew
greatly during the postwar period. Also, the survey has always been
based on larger fins. Fortunately, the national income and product
accounts (NIPA) provide a comprehensive measure of nonwage compensation
whose definition has changed little over the years. If benefits in
academe are not determined too differently from the rest of the economy,
the NIPA data should show similar trends to the AAUP data.
Throughout we define benefits as the sum of voluntarily provided
nonwage payments plus legally mandated nonwage payments. This definition
differs from that in most studies (which include only voluntarily
3provided benefits) ; we account for the difference in our formal analysis.
Table 1 presents the percentages of benefits in total compensation at
four—year intervals since 1960. Column (1) presents the AAUP data for
faculty; column (2) lists the percentages for large firms in the Chamber
of Commerce survey; and column (3) shows the percentages from the NIPA.
Like the other data, the AMJP data exclude time off with pay, so that
total benefits are clearly a greater share of compensation than the
Table indicates. Also, beginning with the 1984-85 data the AMY? survey
included retirement contributions whether vested or not, perhaps
explaining the sharp increase in the share of benefits between 1980—81
and 1984—85.
The most striking feature is howcloselythe growth of benefits in
academic pay tracks that in the other series during this twenty—eight
year period. Even the levels are now quite close. Benefits were a much
greater percentage of compensation at the start of the period in the
Chamber of Commerce data, reflecting the early restriction of that
survey to very large firms. By 1988, though, the expansion of that
survey and the growth of faculty benefits had removed most of the
differences. Despite the differences and changes in definitions, the
growth in benefits paid to faculty members mirrors almost perfectly the
similar growth in the share of benefits in total compensation outside of
academe. Indeed, even the sudden halt in the relative growth of
benefits that occurred nationally in the late 1980s is reflected in the
data covering faculty members.2
Whatemployeebenefits are received by faculty, and how has their
relativeimportance changed? We obtained a short time series of data
detailingthe structure of benefits at a major public university.3
This information is shown in Table 2. Medical and retirement benefits
4Table 1. Benefits as a Percent of Compensation,
Faculty, Large Companies and
National Income Accounts, 1960—88
Faculty' Large FirnsbNational Income Accountsc
1960—61 6.07 12.82 7.92
1964—65 7.05 12.66 8.68
1968—69 9.38 14.31 9.99
1972—13 11.18 16.67 12.28
1976—77 13.26 18.96 14.60
1980—81 15.38 19.29 15.47
1984—85 18.12 19.87 17.01
1988—89 18.49 19.42 16.46
aFor the academic year; all schools with professorial ranks,
AAUP Bulletin, Academe, selected years.
bFor the calendar year 1961, ...,1985,and 1988; from U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Employee Benefits, selected issues. The data exclude
payments for time not worked, such as vacations, paid hoidays,
personal days, etc.
cFor the calendar year 1961 1985, same source as b, and 1988,
Survey of Current Business, July 1989.(both legally mandated PICA and employer—paid TXAA—CREF contributions)
constituted 94.9 percent of total benefit costs in 1988—89. This
compares quite closely to the 90.1 percent among large firms in the
Chamber of commerce survey in 1987. The other benefits over whichso
much discussion occurs ———subsidizedtuition for faculty children,
employer—subsidized life insurance, and others ———arerelatively
unimportant at this particular institution.
The obvious trend in these data is the increasing share of benefit
costs allotted to medical/dental insurance. Again, thefaculty
experience parallels that elsewhere. The second column of Table 2
shows the percentage of total employer contributions to privatepension
and welfare plans in the NIPA data that is accounted forby contributions
to group health plans. It is clear that health insurance isan
increasing fraction of benefit costs, and that the rate of increase has
been especially pronounced in the l980s.
Taken together, the data on faculty compensation and thecomparisons
with other surveys suggest that faculty benefitsare remarkably similar
to those elsewhere in the economy. Although we cannot becertain that
the structure of demand for benefits in academe istypical, we can be
fairly sure that the levels, growth and structure of benefitsare not
unusual.
IL!.Theory and Dala
Sincebenefits are only rarely determined on an individual basis,
implicit in any model of benefits must be some social welfare function
defined over the members of the work group in the particular establish—
ment, firm or set of firms. We do not examine the source of this
function; instead, we take it as predetermined. Workers in thegroup
face the university's budget constraint, which is more or less tilted
5Table 2. Trends in Employee Benefits by Type, a Major Public
University, and Employer Contributions in the National
Income Accounts, 1960—1988
Percentage Distribution, NIPA, Medical
One Public University Percentage of
Total Private
Funds








1980—1981 24.3 38.3 29.5 7.9 43.6
1984—1985 32.5 32.8 27.9 6.8 53.8
1988—198936.0 32.1 26.8 5.1 59.1
Sources: Private information, Michigan State University, Employee
Benefits office. Bureau of Economic Affairs, National Income and
Product Accounts of the United States, 1929—82, Table 6.13; and
Survery of Current Business, July 1988 and July 1989, Table 6.13.toward offering benefits the lesser or greater is the relative cost of
offering those benefits. Relative costs will be affected by any
heterotheticity in the production of benefits versus straight wage
payments and by any tax advantages to the employer.
We thus assume that workers maximize this social welfare function
subject to the total bargained compensation, the relative costs to the
employer of providing wage and nonwage compensation, and the prices of
each that face the typical worker.4 We assume these choices are based
on a utility function that generates a system of demand equations for




where the a, ,yand & are parameters; i and j index types of
compensation; s is the share of the i'th form of compensation in net
(after—tax) total compensation, C; p is the price of the i'th form of
compensation; M is an error term with mean zero and variance 4;x is
a vector of other measurable characteristics of the employer and the
workers, and t denotes the year. This system is defined in terms of the
shares of benefits and wages in total compensation; but the parameter
estimates allow us to infer the effects of price and income changes on
the amount of benefits that employees demand.
Equation system (1) is Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) almost ideal
demand system (referred to henceforth here as the DX system).5 The
system (1) is general enough to allow for heterotheticity of the
preference function and for substantial flexibility in the implied
substitution between benefits and wages. it isalsoeconometrically
tractable and provides estimates of demand (income and relativeprice)
6elasticities. For ease of estimation we follow Deaton and Muellbauer's
suggestion and assume ln(P1) 9 Is,ln(p).
The error term IL'canbe decomposed into:
(2) p =+V11
wherethe e and v11 have zero means and variances o and a?L,respectively.
The C in (2) reflect two sets of unmeasurable characteristics that
remain constant over tine for a particular observation. The first is the
idiosyncratic nature of preferences for benefits that causes workers in a
particular institution to seek above— or below—average benefits given
their compensation and the relative prices they face. The second is the
technology for producing benefits and wages that is unique to the
employer and not captured in the vector DC.To the extent that is
correlated with relative prices or with C, failure to account for the
fixed individual effect will generate biased estimates of the parameters.
The concern about the structure of the error term is not idle. A
faculty that has traded off compensation for nonpecuniary benefits, and
thus whose observed C is unexpectedly low, is also likely to have unusual
tastes for nonwage monetary benefits compared to wages. Similar arguments
can be made about the employer's technology for paying benefits or wages;
and the same sorts of worries should pervade the interpretation ofany
previous cross—section study of the determination of benefits. To
examine this concern, substitute (2) into (1) and, assuming there are
two years in the sample, difference the result:
(3)A51 = — a,1..,J + Alnf)+vftln(i-) + + Au1i=F,w
7Equation (3) provides "within" estimates of the parameters 0,v and8
(Judge et al, 1980). Any change in these estimates from the cross—
section estimates of (1) indicates the importance of the correlation of
the unobservables with relative prices and compensation. It thus
provides a very stringent test of the demand model.
A welter of issues relating to the taxes consumers face clouds the
p
calculation of the appropriate relative price measure, .Dowe
11'
assume that the median faculty member in an institution is single or
married? How many dependents does this person have? What other income
(beyond the academic—year salary) affects the marginal tax rate paid,
and thus the relative price of benefits? Most important, what taxes do
we consider?
We answer the first question by calculating the marginal and
average tax rates facing the median faculty member under the alternative
assunptions that he or she is single, or is married with two children.
In both cases we calculate the sum of the federal and state marginal
income tax rates, t, and t,, using, e.g., the tax schedules for 1984 for
salaries in the 1984—85 academic year.6 we assume in all cases that the
academic—year salary is the only income received by the median faculty
member. This is clearly incorrect; but theerrorit induces is at least
partly offset by the conservative assumption that the faculty member
takes only the standard deduction.7
The biggest problem is the treatment of the payroll tax for OASDHI.
For both single and joint income tax schedules we estimate the DM system
using three alternative approaches. The first simply assumes that




8The second recognizes that this tax can be substantial and that it does
not apply to benefits. It implicitly assumes further that employers
either bear their share of the tax, or that workers bear the entire tax
and expect that they will receive benefits with a present valueequalling
fifty percent of the total tax paid. It thus sets:
p
(4b) L =1—- — — t3.
where t,, is the -marginal OASDHI tax rate on the worker. The final
approach assumes that the worker bears the entire tax and assumes that






Associated with each tax scheme is a different computation of
that results from the assumptions about what is to be included in the
tax price of benefits. For the first tax scheme we compute the net
salary as the actual salary less the federal and state tax bill. Under
the second and third tax schemes we assume that the net salary equals
the actual salary minus the sum of the federal, state and (the worker's
share of) OASDHI taxes. Net compensation C is computed as compensation
(salary plus reported employer-paid benefits) minus this tax bill minus
the employer's share of OASDHI taxes. Thus in estimating (1) both5r
and C as well as the vary with the assumptions made about taxes.9
The demand system (1) is based on the assumption that there are no
constraints on workers' and schools' joint maximization other than the
given total compensation. That assumption is invalidated by the
requirement that all private schools, and many public institutions too
during our sample period, were required to pay taxes into the Old Age
Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (social Security) system.
For some schools this may have increased the amount of benefits bought
9beyond what would have been freely chosen, We cannot observe which
schools are covered by OASDHI. To account at least in part for this
problem, though, and to prevent biases in the estimates of the fland
y,weinclude in the vector X for each public school a measure of the
fraction of public employees in each state who are covered by OASDHI.
An increase in this fraction will increase the benefit share so long as
OASDUX coverage is a binding constraint on choices about alternative
fonts of compensation.'°
The data on salaries and benefits were obtained for the academic
years 1984—85 and 1988—89 from the AXUP. For nearly thirty years these
data have been collected for the AAUP in a mail survey with follow—up.
They cover academic—year payments to instructional faculty. Benefits
Include employers' contributions to retirement, medical insurance,
disability insurance, life insurance, FICA, worker's compensation and
unemployment insurance, tuition, and some in—kind benefits. Measured
gross (pre—tax) compensation, is the sum of reported salaries plus the
monetary cost of benefits. The 1984—85 data were for a sample of 2071
two— and four—year institutions; those for 1988—89 covered 1729
institutions. We foned a panel of 1477 schools that appeared in both
sets of data and that were located in the fifty states or the District
of Columbia.
Table 3 shows some of the characteristics of schools in the panel
for 1988—89, for the total sample and for disaggregations by category of
school and type of control. Benef its form a substantial fraction of
compensation in all categories of institution and under all types of
control. The share of benefits is among the highest inprivate,
doctoral—level schools, where the average salary is alsohighest; it is
lowest in private and church—controlledtwo—year colleges, where
10Table 3. Weighted Means and Standard Deviations of Benefit Share





Doctoral 17.96 19.14 18.38 18.2
level (2.94) (2.21) (2.64) (2.76)
Salary $43,05150,53243,374 44,461
(5,961)(6,571)(4,401) (6,769)
N 115 43 13 171




N 210 78 64 352
General SF 18.29 19.02 18.14 18.47
Baccalaureate (3.41) (3.10)(4.37) (3.81)
Salary $33,688 35,09429,809 32,626
(4,070)(7,198)(4,616) (5,965)
N 106 177 261 544
Two—year s7 19.25 16.98 17.17 19.20
Colleges (3.53) (4.06) (3.02) (3.60)
Salary $32,54623,45022,570 32,346
(5,233)(2,978)(3,076) (5,553)
N 380 18 12 410
All 18.3619.077 18.33 18.48
categories (3.39) (2.99) (4.35) (3.57)
Salary $39,240 43,00633,568 39,299
(6,627)(9,275)(9,275) (7,444)
N 811 316 350 1477salaries are lowest. This is an initial indication eitherthat there
are relative price effects, or that the demand for benefitsdoes not
have a unitary income elasticity.
Despite the limitation of our samples to college anduniversity
faculty, variations in earnings and in state tax lawsgenerate substantial
variation in the marginal tax rates facing the medianfaculty member.
Table 4 shows that this is especially true ifwe use the single—taxpayer
schedule. Even if we apply tax schedules facing
joint filers, though,
the range of tax rates is substantial. The dataalso show that the Tax
Reform Act reduced the variance of tax ratesacross institutions. Even
in 1988—89, though, the range isnearly as wide as the mean value, and
the coefficients of variation that are impliedby these statistics are
actually higher than in 1984-85. By reducing theaverage marginal tax
p rate it also, of course, raised theaverage .
TheAALJP data contain some of the informationon the institutions'
characteristics that is necessary to construct variablesin the vector X.
In order to distinguish differences
resulting from faculty preferences
from those arising from different costsfacing the employer, we include
from this source:1) A set of three dummy variables indicating the
level of the institution ———doctorallevel, comprehensive universities,
and four—year colleges. (The excludedcategory is two—year colleges.)
2) A dwnmy variable for public control of theinstitution. (The excluded
category is private or church control.)3) The size of the faculty.
This is designed to reflectany economies of scale in the provision of
benefits (see Mitchell andAndrews, 1981).
There is substantial evidence(Lewis,1986) that unions' effects on
benefitsexceed those on wages. That beingso, we obtained data on the
collective_bargaining status of eachfaculty in January 1984 and January
11Table 4. Marginal Tax Rates Facing the Median Faculty Member,
1984—85 and 1988—89, Means, Standard Deviations, and
Ranges
Academic Year:
Tax Scheme: 1984—1985 1988—1989
single .420 .394
(.055) (.041)
(.277, .578) (.225, .495)
Joint .336 .278
(.055) (.045)
(.220, .513) (.211, .431)1989, and formed a variable indicating whether the campus was unionized."
There is also some evidence (Ichniowski et al, 1989) that the extent of
unionism and the general pro— or anti—union atmosphere in a labor market
has an effect on compensation that is independent of whether the
particular workplace is unionized. This suggests including in (1) some
wider measure of pro—union sentiment in the labor market where the
school is located. We include the fraction of public—school teachers in
the state in 1982 who were unionized)2 The final dummy variable in
the vector X indicates location in the South. Wages, and probably
compensation too, are lower in the South, other things equal (Johnson,
1983). Accordingly, at a given value of compensation faculty in a
southern school have a higher real income. Assuming their preferences
donot differ from those of their northern counterparts, we should
expect that the share of benefits in their compensation will be higher
if the income elasticity of demand for benefits exceeds one.'3
IV. Estimates or the Demand System
Table 5 presents the estimates of equation (1) for the share of
benefits, s.Wemake the standard assumptions of symmetry and
homogeneity, so that only N-i (=1)of the share equations need be
estimated. The estimates are shown for the tax scheme represented by
(4b)for each of the two academic years and for the differenced data as
described in equation (3). Before discussing' the central parameters of
interest, pandy, consider the the results on the control variables.
The share of benefits is smaller in larger institutions, though the
effect is not large compared to the standard deviation of the size of
faculties. Moreover, the effect disappears in the estimates using the
differenced data.
12Table 5. Estimates of the DII Demand for Benefits, 1984—85,
1988-89 and Differenced Dat&
Sample and Tax Scheme
1984—85 1988—89 Differenced
Single Joint Single Joint Single Joint
Variable
Constant —1.948 —1.804 —1.715 —1.467 —.074 —.067
(.058) (.061) (.051) (.052) (.002) (.003)
log —.151—.123 —.146 —.095 —.277 —.222
(.012) (.014) (.014) (.016) (.013) (.015)
log (C/P) .211 .194 .184 .157 .324 .275
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.009) (.010)
Public Sector .010 .008 .010.010
OASDHI Coverage (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Faculty Size —.021 —.020 —.025 —.022 —.002 —.014
(thousands) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.019) (.020)
Doctoral Level —.040 —.038 —.039 —.034 .004 .004
(or Change in (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.003)
Category)
Comprehensive —.028 —.027 —.022 —.022
universities (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Four—year —.013 —.012 —.013—.013
Colleges (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Teachers .032 .040 .021 .030
Unionized (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
(fraction)
Faculty .002 .003 —.008 —.008 —.001 .001
Unionized (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.008) (.008)
South .013 .014 .010 .013
- (.003)(.003) (.003) (.003)
Public Control .008 .008 —.004 .003
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
It2
-
.566 .513 .525 .441
- .493 .355
astandard errors in parentheses, here and in Tables 6 and 7.We have no good explanation for this finding; it is, though, the
only anomalous result we obtain for the variables in X. The positive
effect of location in the South onis as predicted by our argument
that equal nominal compensation in the South implies higher real
compensation there. Once unionization and the level of the school are
held constant, whether the institution is publicly or privately
controlled has no effect on the share of benefits in total compensation.
The coefficients on the dummy variables show clearly that the share of
benefits decreases steadily as the level of the school increases, other
things equal. This effect too disappears in the estimates based on the
differenced data (though the paucity of observations on schools that
change category makes this inference unreliable) -
Theresults on the two unionization variables are interesting and
somewhat surprising. The share of benefits was (insignificantly) larger
on campuses with collective bargaining for faculty in 1984—85, but it
was (significantly) lower in 1988-89. Moreover, the results for the
differenced sample show that there is no effect of changing collective—
bargaining status on the share of benefits (though again, very few
campuses changed status). These results are consistent with findings
in other studies (Freeman, 1978; Barbezat, 1989) that theaverage pay
of unionized faculty differs little from that of their nonunion
counterparts. Teacher unionization in the entire state where the
campus is located does matter: Moving from the least to the most
heavily unionized state (an increase from 14.6 to 100 percent) would
raise the share of benefits in otherwise identical schools by 2.7
percentage points (based on the results using the single taxpayer's
schedule for 1984—85). This represents an increase ofroughly 15
percent. The spillover effects of unionization on the demand for
13benefits by faculty members are far more important in this sample than
is the union status of the particular institution.
A greater likelihood that a public university is covered by OASDHI
increases the benefit ratio at that campus. Comparing schools whereno
state employees are covered to ones where coverage is universal, we see
that the ratio is increased by about 1 percentage point (roughly 5
percent). This result is consistent with our argument that total
benefits provided under the mandatory coverage of the OASDHI system
exceed what workers and firms agree upon in the absence of coverage:
Mandatory OASDHI coverage shifts compensation further in the direction
of benefits than would occur under purely atomistic behavior.
The most striking results are those on the relative price and
compensation variables. For both 1984—85 and 1988—89 the coefficients
of the price variables are significantly negative and quite close in
magnitude. The sane conclusion holds for the compensation measure.
Benefits are clearly a luxury good; and the share of benefits is clearly
responsive to the tax price of benefits in these two cross sections of
microeconomic data.
The significance and signs of the price and income terms are robust
to inclusion of school—specific fixed effects: The results for the
differenced data also show very significant price effects and heterothetic
preferences (with benefits being relatively preferred as compensation
increases) .Indeed,their magnitude is larger than in the cross section.
At the very least, the results show that the importance of the tax price
in these samples (and perhaps elsewhere in the literature) is not an
artifact produced by unobservable individual effects.
Table 6 presents various price and income elasticities based on the
estimates shown in Table 5. In the DM system with just two commodities
14Table 6. Estimates of Substitution, Income and Uncompensated Price
Elasticities, 1984—85, 1988—89 and Differenced Data
1984—85 1988—89 Differenced
SingleJoint Single Joint Single Joint
Parameter
2.053 1.912 2.008 1.697 2.912 2.641
(.282) (.263) (.253) (.203) (.382) (.351)
—2.080—1.958 —2.013 —1.741 —2.901—2.651
(.290) (.265) (.257) (.214) (.396) (.359)
0.228 0.184 0.218 0.144 0.405 0.318
(.033) (.029) (.031) (.058) (.042) (.034)
2.210 2.201 2.039 1.970 2.846 2.701
(.395) (.395) (.307) (.288) (.458) (.431)
0.744 0.769 0.776 0.812 0.607 0.672
(.019) (.016) (.015) (.012) (.023) (.020)the estimated elasticity of substitution between wages and benefitsis:
r]
+









Thestandard errors of these estimates are estimated based on the variance
and covariances of the '9,,and and on the fitted shares of benefits
and wages.
The income elasticities make it clear that benefits are a "preferred
form of compensation." While the magnitudes vary, the income elasticities
in these samples of faculty cluster around two. These effects are quite
independent of any correlation of prices with compensation that is
induced by progressive income tax schedules. The estimated uncoulpensated
price elasticities demonstrate that the demand for benefits is price
elastic. Changes in income taxes induce a change in the relative price
of benefits and wages that in these samples generates substantial
substitution between wages and nonwage compensation.
As the final two columns in Table 6 show, the highly price— and
income—elastic demand for benefits is not an artifact of omitted
unobservables. In the differenced data the results are even stronger
than in the cross sections. At least for this fairly homogeneous sample
of workers observed at the workplace level, which is the appropriate
unit of observation, the price of benefits affects the demand for them.
- 15The demand is also clearly heterothetic, even accounting for differences
in preferences that may be correlated with unmeasured differences in
faculty members' characteristics.
The estimates of these parameters are remarkably robust to various
changes in the assumptions that we have made. Using the measures of
the tax price of benefits in (4a) or (4c) instead of that in (4b) makes
little difference. For example, using the tax schedules for single
taxpayers, and estimating the model based on the 1984—85 data, we find
that is —2.07 if tax scheme (4a) is used, and is —2.13 if tax
scheme (4c) is used. These are virtually identical to the estimate
in Table 6. similarly, suppose that, instead of the Deaton—Muellbauer
demand system, one characterizes the demand for benefits and wages by a
heterothetic translog approximation. This too produces only minor
changes in the results. Again taking asan example, the estimate
for 1984—85 becomes —2.29.
These price and income elasticities differ little from those
obtained by Woodbury (1983) using data covering a cross section of
school districts. They are, though, somewhat higher than most of the
estimates of the effect of prices (through taxes) and incomes on the
supply of charitable contributions, a subject that poses related issues.
Even there, though, many of the estimates summarized by Clotfelter
(1985, Table 2.12) indicate the demand is price—elastic, and a few
suggest the demand is income elastic too.
Are there differences in the sensitivity of faculty members in
different types of institutions to changes in the tax price of benefits?
Table 7 presents the estimates for 1984—85 of the same five parameters
shown in Table 6. These are based on the tax scheme in (4b) and use
the single taxpayers' schedule. There are few significant differences
16Table 7. Estimates of Substitution, Price and IncomeElasticities
for Various Subsamples
Subsample
public Institutions 2.451 —2.390 0.310 2.117 0.751
(.339) (.350) (.038) (.324) (.020)
Public Institutions, 2.800 —2.734 0.387 2.530 0.659
excluding 2—year (.409) (.422) (.048) (.436) (.027)
Private Institutions1.714 —1.817 0.161 2.341 0.736
(.247) (.244) (.035) (.494) (.021)
Private Institutions, 2.092 —2.106 0.217 2.176 0.769
excluding 2—year (.285) (.288) (.0)0) (.356) (.017)
All Institutions, 2.296 —2.284 0.267 2.227 0.745
excluding 2—year (.315) (.325) (.033) (.365) (.018)
Doctoral—Level 2.485 —2.441 0.333 2.252 0.711
Institutions (.318) (.318) (.045) (.317) (.030)
Comprehensive 2.795 —2.731 0.380 2.442 0.683
Institutions (.443) (.456) (.049) (.439) (.027)
General Baccalaureate 2.081 —2.118 0.215 2.310 0.748
Institutions (.295) (.295) (.033) (.398) (.018)
Two—Year Institutions 1.607 —1.722 0.157 2.254 0.728
(.245) (.230) (.043) (.465) (.026)
zstimates throughout are from the 1984—85 cross-section using the
single taxpayer's schedule.among the various types of institutions; but the demand for benefits by
faculty In two—year institutions responds significantly less than that
of their counterparts in comprehensive institutions. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, the demand for benefits in public institutions is
significantly more elastic than that in private schools. No matter
which category of institution we choose, though, the demand for benefits
is highly price— and income—elastic.
V. SimulatingTheEffectsofTax and Other Changes
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 sharply reduced the marginal tax rate
facing the typical faculty member, as the statistics for our samples
presented in Table 4 demonstrate. As such, it raised the relative price
of benefits and presumably rçduced the growth of benefits relative to
salaries. How large was this effect? For example, if the 1988 tax
structure had existed in 1984, how much lower would the share of
benefits have been in 1984—85 than it actually was?
To answer this question we compare the actual shares of benefits
(the dependent variables in equation (1)) first to the shares adjusted
for changes in the tax laws, and then adjusted for changes in tax laws
and all other factors that we assume influence the demand for benefits.
The first adjustment yields an adjusted share of benefits for 1988—69 as:
— C84 — ra4
588
S4 =+ 84ln +y341np—+684X84,
84
where &34 andLarethe estimates based on the 1984—85 data, and
P and p!W. are a price index and relative prices for 1984,
W84
simulatedusing the 1988 tax structure. The second adjustment uses the
same parameter estimates to calculate:
-
17S4&04 ÷ A14in[J÷ c34in(!tJ+ a4xs2
The difference between the means of s and (the actual share of
benefits in 1984—85) is an estimate of the change induced by the
revision in the tax laws. Similar adjustments using the parameter
estimates based on the 1988—89 data can be made, and the difference
between the means of 4ands yields an alternative
estimate of the effect of the revisions in tax laws.
The difference between the means of 54 and s is a residual that
shows the total change in the benefit share caused by changes in the
parameters in (1). This difference indicates the change in the share
that would have occurred if taxes, compensation and the X variables had
not changed, but people's responses to them, including an intercept
ten, had changed. Comparing to provides an alternative estimate
of this effect.
The means of the actual and adjusted shares are shown in Table 8.
The most striking comparisons are between the actual shares of benefits
and those that would have been observed had tax laws, most
importantly, the federal tax law, not been revised (st). The first two
means in the first row show that, had the 1988 tax laws been in effect
in 1984, the share of benefits would have been 1.2 percentage points
lower. Obversely, as shown in the third row, had the 1984 tax laws
remained in effect in 1988, the share of benefits would have been 1.9
percentage points higher. The change in the share of benefits produced
by the drastic alteration in the tax laws appears smaller if we base the







Single 0.174 0.162 0.192
Joint 0.161 0.158 0.181
1988—89
Single 0.176 0.195 0.162
Joint 0.163 0.166 0.146comparisons on the estimates using the joint tax schedules, only .3
percentage points.
Taken together, these simulations imply that legislated reductions
in marginal tax rates reduced the share of benefits in total compensation
of academics by between .3 and 1.9 percentage points. The importance
of these induced changes is demonstrated by inquiring how a continuation
of the 1984 tax laws would have affected the mix of compensation
nationally, assuming that the tax laws had the same effect on the
benefits paid to all workers over this four-year period as they did on
benefits in academe. Total compensation in 1988 was $2.91 trillion.
Using the low estimates based on the joint tax schedules, we estimate
that employers' spending on benefits in 1988 would have been $9 billion
higher. Extrapolating from our model, we may infer that the revisions
in the tax law induced employers to switch at least this amount from
benefit to wage and salary payments. While we do not claim that
inferring the demand by all workers for benefits from faculties' demand
is entirely justified, the similarity of the trends in compensation
between academics and all workers makes it at least a reasonable
extrapolation. It
Thesesimulations suggest that the Tax Reform Act generated a major
change in the outcomes of worker—employer contracting, and, in particular,
that it met one of its goals of inducing shifts of income from nontaxed
to taxable forms. This corroborates evidence (Slemrod, 1990) for the
effect of taxes on the timing of activities, though it is inconsistent
with the apparent small long—run effects found on much real behavior.
The effect on the share of benefits of changes in the coefficients
is also substantial. Using the single taxpayers' schedule, the share
of benefits would have been .192 in 1988—89 if the coefficients had not
19changed from 1984—85, not the .174 that was observed. Obversely, had
the responses that prevailed in 1988—89 existed in 1984—85, the average
share of benefits would have been only .162, not .176. The change in
the share due to changing coefficients ranges between —.014 and —.020 in
the four possible comparisons.
The source of this change can be seen clearly without doing a
complete decomposition. Pooling the observations for the two years, but
including a separate intercept for 1988—89, gives results that are
consistent with the hypothesis that there was no structural change in
the a, p, yand8. The estimated separate intercept for 1988—89,
though, equals —.012 using the single tax schedule to form the tax—price
measure, and —.014 using the loint tax schedule. Both intercepts have
snail standard errors. Something that changed over this period and for
which we have not controlled caused the intercept of the demand function
for employee benefits to shift down during this period.
We saw in Table 2 that the share of health—care costs in total
benefits rose rapidly during the 1980s. We also know that the real
price of health insurance rose by 28.5 percent.'5 This suggests that
the short—run demand for health—care benefits is price inelastic. It
must therefore be the case that the cross—price elasticities of demand
for other benefits with respect to the price of health care are negative
(as found by Woodbury and Huang, 1989). Only with this combination of
unobserved parameters can we reconcile the unexplained decrease in
benefits with the observed greater share of health—care benefits and the
estimated price-elastic demand for all benefits together.
VI.Conclusions and Implications for Academic Labor Markets
Wehave examined the determinants of variations in the demand for
employee benefits among academic institutions and over time. The
20evidence demonstrates clearly that the demand for benefits withrespect
to taxes is quite elastic. Our use of longitudinalestablishment—level
data and a variety of different measures of marginal tax rates make this
demonstration the strongest available. The results also show that the
demand for benefits is income elastic.
The simulations provide striking evidence on the impact of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the demand for employee benefits. Because of
the declines in average marginal tax rates that occurred between 1984
and 1988 (between 3 and 6 percentage points in our sample), the share
of benefits in 1988 was lower by roughly one-half percentage point than
it would otherwise have been. That share was also lower by an additional
percentage point due to factors that could not be included in the
estimation.
Employee benefits have been a large and growing form of academic
compensation. Interpreting these trends in light of our estimates and
simulations, their growth was stimulated during the 196os by the rapid
growth of real compensation of academics and by a small increase in the
average marginal tax rate.'6 During the 1970s marginal tax rates rose
rapidly, while income effects resulting from the decline in real academic
compensation were insufficient to offset the price effects. In the
1980s, with real academic compensation again increasing, the positive
income effect on benefits was mostly offset by the price effects as
marginal tax rates declined and the cost of health insurance rose.
Supply and demand conditions during the 1990s are likely to cause real
academic compensation to rise. It is not likely that marginal tax rates
will be reduced further. Unless the cost of benefits, especially health
insurance, continues to escalate, we can predict that the share of
benefits in total compensation will resume its growth during the l990s.
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23FOOTNOTES
1. For example, Johnson and Stafford (1974); }iamermesh et al (1982).
2. Additional evidence of this turnaround is reported in a survey of
smaller fins, which reported that total benefits declined from 29 to
25 percent of payroll between 1985 and 1988.(wall Street Journal,
October 24, 1989, page 1)
3. We are indebted to Ms. Kristine Hynes who made these data available
to us.
4. Implicitly here and in formulating tax prices in the empirical work
we assume that it is the preferences of the median (in terms of wages)
worker that determine the choices made about the compensation package.
5. The utility function that produces (1) is not standard or easily
tractable analytically. It does, though, satisfy the conventional
requirements of such functions, and, most important, it generates the
empirically convenient yet general DM system.
6. The calculation of federal marginal personal income tax rates (ti)
proceeds as follows. First, we assume that the median faculty member
is single, subtract from the average faculty salary one exemption and
the standard deduction for a singl filer, and apply the remainder to
the single—filing tax schedule. Second, we assume the median faculty
member is married with two children, subtract from the average faculty
salary four exemptions and the standard deduction for married joint
filers, and apply the remainder to the married—filing jointly tax
schedule. calculation of state marginal personal income tax rates
(t,) proceeds by analogy, using the appropriate tax structure in each
state for the cases of single and married—filing jointly.
7. Johnson and Stafford (1974) present estimates of nine—month salaries
and gross professional earnings in six academic specialities in 1970.
Among academics with 15 years of post—degree experience average other
earnings ranged from 12 percent of the nine—month salary (in physics) to
44 percent (in biology), with the unweighted average being 25 percent.
It is not likely that this percentage is higher today.
8. Using the nominal OASDHI rate would ignore the likelihood that the
fraction of faculty earnings that exceeds the OASDHI tax base differs
across institutions. To measure the actual OASDHI rate facing the
typicalfaculty member at each institution we took random samples of
nine—monthsalaries of 100 faculty members at our own school in 1984—85
and1988—89 and calculated the fraction e of their total earnings that
escaped the tax. we shifted this distribution up or down (maintaining
its coefficient of variation) to derive an estimate of e for each other
school under the assumption that the distribution of pay was a multiple
of that at our school. Each ewas then used to adjust the nominal tax
rateto yield:
(1 —e]t
This measure was used in (4b) and (4c). As an illustration of its
importance, in 1984-85, when t,, equalled .07, t5, ranged from .043
to .07, with a mean of .064 and a standard deviation of .005.
249. The approaches implicit in (4a)—(4c) are highly structured
transformations of the tax rates imputed for each institution. An
alternative, atheoretic approach would simply enter each tax rate,
tr,
t, and t,,, for each observation when estimating (1) and (3). We
tried this approach also. The tax rates generally had significant
positive effects on the benefit-compensation ratios that form the
dependent variables. Most important, in the differenced data for both
single and joint filers each of the three tax rates had a significant
positive effect on the ratio of benefits to total compensation.
10. The data are from census of Governments, 1982, Volume II, No. 1,
Table 9. All the estimates were also produced without this variable,
with little change in the implied values of the price and income
elasticities of demand for benefits, but with some slight reduction in
the explanatory power of the equations.
11. These data are tabulated by Douglas (1984, 1988) based on information
accrued from a variety of reports on collective—bargaining activity.
12. The data are from census of Governments, 1982, Volume III, No. 3,
Table 2. As an alternative, we substituted the fraction of workers in
the state who were union members in 1981 (from Kokkelenberg and Sockell,
1985). Using this alternative had only minute effects on the estimates
of the other parameters.
13. The age distribution of the faculty (the age of the median faculty
member if one assumes the median voter's preferences determine the
mix of wages and benefits in an institution) might also affects1. We
do not have data on the age distribution, but there were data on the
distribution of faculty by professorial rank. Equations (1) and (3)
were also estimated with variables measuring the fraction of the faculty
at each rank, and with the rank of the median faculty member. Both
measures had coefficients that were small and insignificant; their
inclusion produced only tiny changes in the other parameter estimates.
14. Regarding benefits, "You now have learned enough to see! That cats
(faculty] are much like you and me/ And other people whom we find!
Possessed of various types of mind." (T. S. Eliot, "The Addressing of
Cats," Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats, London: Faber and Faber, 1940
15. The rates of increase used in the rest of this Section are
calculated from Bureau of Economic Affairs, National Income and Product
Accounts of the United states, 1929—82, and Survey of Current Business,
subsequent July issues.
16. In 1982 dollars average academic nine—month compensation in 1960—
61 was $27,781; in 1970—71 it was $37,354; in 1980—81, $32,275, and in
1988—89, $40,149. (See AAUP Bulletin and Academe, selected issues.)
Barro and sahasakul (1983) provide a time series of the path of average
(federal) marginal income tax rates, which rose from 23 percent in 1960
to 24 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1980. The tax rate for the
employee's OASDHI contribution rose from 3 percent in 1960 to 4.8
percent in 1970 to 6.13 percent in 1980.(social security Bulletin,
Annual Statistical Supplement, 1986.) In 1988 the average
federal marginal income tax rate was certainly below 28 percent, and
the OASDHI tax rate on employees was 7.51 percent.
25